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ABSTRACT
IRINA STEFANESCU: Capital Structure Decisions and Corporate Pension Plans
(Under the direction of Anil Shivdasani)
This paper examines the capital structure puzzle that many firms appear to be underlevered 
from a tax savings perspective. More specifically, this paper explores the capital structure 
implications of sponsoring corporate pension plans and finds that firms are significantly less 
underlevered once off balance sheet pension obligations are accounted for. I treat corporate 
pension plans as fully owned subsidiaries and I find that sponsoring companies are 35% more 
levered on consolidated accounts. I calculate marginal tax rates by explicitly taking into 
account the effect of pension contributions on taxable income and I find that the tax benefits 
of debt are 47% larger once pension debt is accounted for. I also estimate that the 
underleverage gap closes by 31% due to pension deductions. Additionally, I provide 
evidence that sponsoring companies use less debt on average than do comparable, non-
sponsoring companies. 
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful for the continuous guidance and advice of my advisor Anil Shivdasani. I am 
indebted to John Graham for his invaluable support and encouragement. Special thanks go to 
Matthias Kahl for his advice, patience and kindness. 
My heartfelt thanks go to my parents and especially to my grandmother for believing in 
me during this incredible journey. To my husband, Catalin and to my son, Daniel for never 
letting me lose perspective of the really important things in life.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………………………………....vi
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………….vii
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS AND CORPORATE PENSION PLANS
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...….1
2. Institutional features of pension plans…………………………………………………...…8
2.1. Description of pension plans……………………………………….………………..8
2.2 Pension accounting and funding requirements………………………….………….11
2.3. Disclosure……………………………………………………………………….....14
3. Integration of the firm with the defined benefit plan…………………………...................15
4. Data and consolidated balance sheet issues…………………………………..…..……….19
4.1. Data…………………………………………………………………………...……19
4.2. Reported and consolidated leverage…………………………...…………………..21
5. Refinement of marginal tax rates and recalculation of the tax benefits of debt…………..24
5.1. Research design……………………………………………………………………24
5.2. Simulation results………………………………………………………………….27
6. Interdependence between the pension liability and the balance sheet debt………………29
6.1. Econometric model………………………………………………………………...29
6.2. Empirical results…………………………………………………………………...32
v7. Limitations………………………………………………………………………………...36
8. Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………...38
APPENDIX I. Estimation of the corporate marginal tax rate………………………………..41
APPENDIX II. AMR Corporation: Extract from 10-k filling, 2002……………………...…44
REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………....47
vi
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Balance sheet pension plan exposure ……………………………………….……….……57
2. Reported and consolidated leverage ratios …………………………………………...…..60
3. Sample characteristics of pension sponsors/non-sponsors relative to debt 
issuers/non-issuers………………………………………………………………………...61
4. Distribution of marginal tax rates per year and type of firm…………………………..….62
5. Tax benefits of debt…………………………………………………………………….....63
6. Relationship between reported and pension debt………………………………………….64
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure                                                                                                                                   Page
1. The aggregate level of pension funding…………………….……………………………..52
2. Differences between reported and consolidated balance sheet leverage………………….53
3. Effect of pension contributions on marginal tax rates for Pepsi Bottling
Group (2002)……………………………………………………………………………....54
4. Aggregate effect of pension plan contributions on marginal tax rates…………................55
5. Tax benefits of debt……………………………………………………………………….56
CAPITAL STRUCTURE DECISIONS AND CORPORATE PENSION PLANS
“Investing in our pension as long as we get the tax deduction for it is a very good 
investment for us, Harry Stonecipher, president and chief executive officer of Boeing, 
told analysts in a third quarter conference call in October. Boeing’s $3.6 billion 
contribution in 2004 will result in a tax benefit that year of between 1.1 billion and $1.3 
billion, assuming a tax rate of 30% to 35%, according to Boeing spokesman John 
Dern.”
Wall Street Journal (2005), “How companies make the most on pensions”
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the capital structure puzzle that firms appear to be are underleveraged
from a tax savings perspective. The tradeoff theory of capital structure predicts that firms 
will borrow up to the point where the marginal value of tax shields on additional debt is just 
offset by the increase in the costs of financial distress. There is a general consensus that 
significant tax incentives are associated with corporate borrowing. Nevertheless, many large 
and profitable companies with a low risk of financial distress have relatively low debt ratios. 
The perceived inefficiency of capital structure from a tax perspective is particularly 
surprising, since taxes seem to be “important” or “very important” to most of the CFOs 
surveyed by Graham and Harvey (2001).
Several studies have documented a negative relation between profitability and leverage, 
challenging the tradeoff theory, suggesting that firms do not fully exploit their tax shields and 
therefore, appear to be underleveraged  (e.g., Miller (1977), Fama and French (2002) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) among others). Recently, Graham (2000) quantified the tax 
benefits by estimating marginal tax rates and concluded that “the firms that use debt 
2conservatively are large, profitable, liquid, in stable industries”, and face low ex ante costs of 
distress. He estimates that the typical firm could add up to 15.7% (7.3%) to firm value, 
ignoring (considering) the personal tax penalty on debt financing.
The literature has advanced several explanations for the insufficient use of debt in capital 
structure. On the supply side, Faulkender and Petersen (2005) suggest that firms are rationed 
by lenders and have a limited ability to increase leverage. On the demand side, Molina 
(2005) and Almeida and Philipon (2006) re-estimate the ex ante probability of distress, 
accounting for endogeneity and default risk premium, and find a stronger impact on leverage.
Another line of research investigates whether non-debt tax shields substitute for interest 
deductions for corporations, as suggested by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). Bradley, Jarell 
and Kim (1984) and MacKie-Mason (1990) examine the role of depreciation and tax credits. 
While many of the non-debt tax shields can be easily detected on the income statement, many 
others are not disclosed at all, or at best, they are hidden in footnotes (ex. stock option 
deductions, tax shelters, pension contributions). Firms that appear highly profitable on their 
financial statements could, in fact, have very low taxable income. Graham, Lang, and 
Shackelford (2004) examine NASDAQ 100 and S&P 100 firms and find that option 
deductions are substitutes for interest deductions in corporate capital structure decisions.
Graham and Tucker (2006) investigate 44 cases of tax sheltering and find that the average tax 
deduction produced by the shelters are about three times as large as interest deductions of 
comparable firms. In a recent working paper, Schallheim and Wells (2006) use an alternative 
measure for all non -debt tax deductions -the tax spread- and find that it is positively related 
to Graham’s measure of debt conservatism.
3Departing from the existing literature, this paper addresses the underleverage issue by re-
examining the structure of liabilities of the firm. Despite the noticeable size and high
seniority of pension plan obligations, the role of corporate defined benefit pension plans is
missing from the capital structure debate. The deferred compensation for employees arising 
from corporate pension plans constitutes another form of debt of the company. Pension 
contributions are tax deductible, similar to the interest payments on debt, and failure to make 
mandatory contributions ultimately leads to bankruptcy.  Yet, most pension plan accounts are 
kept off balance sheet, and a very intricate pension accounting process often obscures their 
importance.
As the recent bear market has proven, understanding the role of corporate pension plans on 
the financial policy of sponsoring companies is very important. Most sponsoring companies 
were depleted of cash and their credit ratings were adversely affected by large levels of 
underfunding. G. B. Stewart comments on this subject in the Harvard Business Review 
(2003):  “Pension liabilities have real teeth. Whether paid out of cash or bankruptcy 
proceeds, a company pension liability is senior even to its most senior lenders. It is a liability 
so binding it should be boldly printed on a company’s balance sheet at the very top of its list 
of debts. The surest indication that the pension assets are (also) real is their direct effect on 
corporate cash flows, debt, earnings and market value.”
A corporate pension plan has the features of a fully owned subsidiary, except for its 
separate legal status. In fact, the accounting literature has long concluded that pension fund
property rights should lie with the firm and that pension plan assets and liabilities are valued 
by the securities markets as corporate assets and liabilities (e.g. Landsman (1986), Barth 
(1991), Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1992), Jin, Merton and Bodie (2006)). These studies 
4suggest that capital structure decisions should rely on consolidated accounts.  I, therefore,
proceed by integrating pension plan assets and liabilities onto the corporate balance sheet. 
The intricacy of pension accounting and elaborated funding rules combined with the opacity 
of pension disclosures complicates the adjustment.  
This study covers all publicly traded firms available in the Compustat database from 1991 
to 2003, well after the enactment of funding rules in the Pension Protection Act (1987) and 
immediately after data on pension costs became available. About one fourth of the firms in 
the sample have defined benefit plans, and for these firms, the aggregate ratio of plan assets 
to operating assets is on average 17.5%. Pension contributions are 3.9% of earnings before 
interest and taxes, while interest deductions account for 11.8%. For the subset of sponsoring 
companies, both book and market leverage is 35% larger based on consolidated accounts. 
Book leverage increases from 26% to 35%, while market leverage increases from 20% to 
27%.
Pension liabilities are long term binding obligations towards employees, and have all the 
characteristics of debt. Pension contributions are, therefore, the equivalent of interest 
payments on debt and an important source of tax savings. Following the methodology 
described in Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a, 2000) I recalculate the tax benefits from 
debt and pensions as the area below the tax benefit function, which plots simulated marginal 
tax rates corresponding to different levels of the interest expense. Pension accounting 
introduces another divergence between accounting and taxable income, a feature that has not 
been previously examined. The accrued pension expense is an operating expense for 
financial purposes, but it is the pension contribution that is deductible for tax purposes. Any 
difference between the pension contribution and the pension cost weakens the link between 
5taxable and book income, but it is the pension contribution that ultimately affects marginal 
tax rates.
For the set of sponsoring companies with sufficient data to simulate marginal tax rates, 
pension contributions are, on average, 59% of the total interest expense. The tax benefits of 
all debt (pension and financial debt) increase by 47% once pensions are taken into account. 
The tax savings from pension contributions account for 2% of the market value of the 
company. A careful look at the characteristics of the firms sponsoring pension plans reveals 
that most of these companies operate on the flat segment of their tax benefit functions and far 
from the point where marginal tax benefits start declining. Graham (2000) defines this point 
as “the kink” and uses it as a measure of how aggressively firms use debt. I estimate that the 
integration of pensions into the capital structure analysis diminishes the underleverage gap by 
about 31%. Firms appear to adopt less conservative debt policies after pensions are taken into 
account.
In terms of dollar benefits, my analysis finds that the gross aggregate savings attributable
to contributions deductibility amounts to $14 billion per year during the period 1991-2003. I 
find similar tax benefits of interest deductibility as reported in Graham (2000) for the period 
1991-1995, the years for which our studies overlap. For the sample period, the yearly average 
of the gross benefits of debt amounts to $58 billion for firms without pensions and to $60 
billion for firms with pensions. 
Debt conservatism is pervasive among profitable companies in both high growth (e.g. 
technology) and low growth (e.g. manufacturing) sectors. Graham, Lang, and Shackelford’s 
(2004) examine the effects of stock option deductions on marginal tax rates and debt policy. 
While they acknowledge important effects of option deductions on marginal tax rates on the 
6set of firms included in NASDAQ 100 firms (the most profitable and stable among the high 
growth technology firms), they do not find similar effects on the set of S&P100 firms 
(traditional and stable industries firms). It is important to note that most of the companies 
having corporate pension plans fall exactly into this last category (old, mature, unionized 
industries). These companies are also large, highly profitable, have a low expected cost of 
distress and low costs from debt financing. Therefore, this study directly complements their 
findings and evidence of significant tax benefits associated with pensions serves as the 
missing link in the capital structure debate. 
The results on pension tax benefits are also consistent with those of Thomas (1988), who 
examines the link between tax status and corporate funding policy. He finds that pension 
contributions are positively correlated with the sponsor’s tax status and that firms with a low 
tax status are less likely to adopt defined benefit plans. Petersen (1992) also finds that the 
decision to terminate the pension plan is driven in part by taxes, as terminations most often 
coincide with low tax years. Both papers emphasize an important role for taxes in managing 
corporate pension plans.
Although the institutional setting of pension assets and liabilities supports their integration 
into corporate assets and liabilities, the question remains whether, in practice, corporate 
managers integrate pension plans into their overall corporate financial policy. The tradeoff 
theory predicts that firms have target capital structures. To the extent that managers treat the 
pension liability as a substitute for debt, we should observe, ceteris paribus, large pension 
obligations associated with low leverage ratios. I find that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
pension liability to total assets ratio is associated with a 0.36 percentage point decrease of 
debt to total assets ratio. This result suggests that managers partially substitute pension 
7related deductions for interest deductions in capital structure decisions. The imperfect 
substitution could be attributable to either the measurement error in the disclosed pension 
liability measure or to the effect of the insurance provided by the Pension Benefit Guarantee 
Corporation during financial distress. An alternative possibility is that firms’ marginal cost of 
issuing pension debt is lower. Sponsoring a defined benefit plan introduces another layer of 
liabilities to the corporate balance sheet, and also gives managers considerable discretion to 
manipulate earnings. Bergstresser, Desai, and Rauh (2005) argue that managers use pension 
assumptions to inflate earnings before acquisitions and stock option exercises. The same 
discretion potentially allows managers to issue equity on more favorable terms, diluting the 
effect of pension liabilities on the balance sheet debt.
The results of this study are consistent with the findings of several recent papers that
examine the interdependence between corporate financial policy and pension plan investment 
policy. Rauh (2004) documents a negative relation between large required pension 
contributions and the level of corporate investment.  Frank (2002) finds a positive 
relationship between defined benefit plan asset allocation and the firms’ tax benefits. Jin, 
Merton and Bodie (2006) suggest that failure to take into account off balance sheet pension 
assets and liabilities biases upward the cost of capital and could result in suboptimal capital 
budgeting decisions and underinvestment. The partial substitutability I find is also in line 
with Graham and Tucker’s (2006) finding that tax sheltering firms have leverage ratios that 
are about 500 basis points lower than non-sheltering firms.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces institutional 
features of pension plans. Section 3 develops testable hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
data and consolidated balance sheet issues. Section 5 provides the refinement of the marginal 
8tax rates and the recalculation of tax benefits of debt. Section 6 examines the effect of 
pension debt on corporate financial policy. Section 7 reports some of the limitations of this 
study, and section 8 concludes.
2. Institutional features of pension plans
2.1. Description of pension plans
In the United States, employers can choose between two basic types of retirement plans: a 
defined contribution plan (DCP) or a defined benefit plan (DBP). Defined benefit plans 
provide a specific amount of benefits to employees at retirement, whereas defined 
contribution plans specify the amount of contributions to be made by the employer toward 
the employee’s retirement account. Due to the differing contractual obligations, in these two 
types of plans the risk is shared differently between the two parties (employer and 
employee). In a DCP, beyond the contribution, the employer has no legal obligation on any 
deficit between funds available in the employee’s account and the employee’s expectations. 
In a DBP, the employer agrees to pay a certain level of benefits and therefore bears all the 
investment risk. Under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA 1974),
firms with defined benefit plans have a legal responsibility to fund the plan with assets 
sufficient to meet their pension obligations. This paper relies on these important 
characteristics, and henceforth any reference to pension plans in this paper refers to defined-
benefits corporate pension plans (DBPs). 
Recently, some employers have started to offer cash balance pension plans (CBPs). These 
plans share characteristics of both the defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. A 
cash balance plan defines the promised benefit in terms of a stated account balance, 
9independent of expected future salary levels, age at retirement, etc. Because promised 
benefits do not depend on the value of plan assets, all risks and rewards from plan assets are 
borne by employers. Despite a different process for calculating promised benefits, CBPs have 
the same legal obligations for employees as DBPs. For this reason, I do not differentiate 
CBPs from DBPs in the subsequent analysis.
Why do companies sponsor defined benefit plans? Historically, the adoption of DBPs has 
been encouraged through important tax incentives. Contributions to pension plans are tax 
deductible, while employee income from the pension plans is tax deferred. This enables 
funds in pension plans to grow at a faster rate (compounded tax-free) than if they were held 
by firms or their employees. At retirement, employees pay taxes on pension benefits, but 
their marginal tax rates are usually lower than during their employment years. There is an 
additional tax benefit when plan assets are invested in bonds: since the full pre-tax return on 
plan assets is delivered to the corporation after payment of corporate taxes and then 
distributed to shareholders, interest income from bonds held by the plan is taxed at the lower, 
equity individual income rate.1
Several other benefits emanate from corporate pension plans. DBPs create strong 
incentives for workers to remain with the firm because they suffer wealth losses if they quit 
early (see e.g., Ippolito (1985)). Because firms have some degree of discretion over pension 
contributions, pension plans are also a source of financial slack (Ballester, Fried and Livnat 
(2002)).  A minimum contribution is generally required if the value of plan assets is below 
the estimated value of pension liabilities, but the contribution is otherwise waived. Current 
1Generally, investors demand higher risk-adjusted returns on bonds because the interest income tax rates are 
above long term capital gains tax rates, which are also tax deferred. This is referred to as the personal tax 
penalty. The arbitrage hypothesis arising from the investment of pension plan assets in bonds was initiated by 
two theoretical studies (Black 1980 and Tepper 1981) and has been tested empirically by several papers (e.g. 
Frank 2002).
10
and future contributions are affected by changes in actuarial assumptions, and discretion over 
assumptions has attracted the opportunistic behavior of managers.  Bergstresser, Desai, and
Rauh (2005) explore this issue and find that managers are more aggressive when assumptions 
have a greater impact on earnings, when they exercise stock options, and before acquiring 
firms. 
From a historical perspective, defined benefit plans were considered an excellent 
compensation incentive at the time when most firms first adopted them. The conditions 
under which they were initially offered changed significantly. Fewer companies have 
adopted DBPs in the recent years and many healthy companies are freezing their pension 
plans2 or even terminating them3. An intense global competition and a sophisticated work 
force requiring more portable compensation, lead to new incentive instruments (e.g. stock 
options, 401(k) plans). Executives have lost interest in these pension plans since their 
retirement plans became disconnected from those offered to rank and file employees4.
Ultimately, the driving force behind the shift from DBPs to DCPs appears to be a sustained 
increased in the costs associated with DBPs5. Companies have reacted to the increased 
competition by decreasing total compensation with a preference on cutting fringe benefits 
2The freeze of a pension plan means a discontinuation of future accruals. The plan is closed to new workers 
(soft freeze), whom are offered instead alternative arrangements (such as 401ks). Often, pension benefits of 
existing participants are locked at current salaries levels and tenure (hard freeze). PBGC estimates that most of 
the single-employer benefit plans that were frozen during 2003 were small plans -only about 2.5% of 
participants of DBPs were affected by the freezes.
3The number of qualified plans insured by PBGC has greatly decreased since the mid-1980s peak. However, the 
number of participants (active and inactive) has increased from 28 million to about 35 million.
4See, e.g. Munnell, Golub-Saas, Soto, Vitagliano (2006), Sundaram and Yermack (2006). While initially both 
high paid and low paid employees had a stake in the same pension plan, now the legislation limits the amounts 
of benefits one could receive on a tax favored basis. Given the dramatic rise in the CEOs compensation in the 
last decades, these qualified (tax favored) pension plans become insignificant for them. Companies now provide 
instead “non- qualified” supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPS).
5The contributions to DCPs are least twice smaller than those associated with a DBP according to Munnell and 
Soto (2004).
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over cash wages. Similarly, companies have reacted to the enormous increase of health costs
by decreasing pension benefits. Pension contributions have also increased due to a larger than 
anticipated life expectancy and lower mortality rates (embedded into the calculation of the 
pension obligation). In addition, changes in the pension accounting are expected to bring 
pension assets and liabilities on the balance sheet and “mark-to-market” pension expenses are 
expected to bring the much “undesired” earnings volatility on the income statement.
2.2. Pension accounting and funding requirements
Although sponsoring companies are liable for the benefits promised to their employees, 
pension assets and liabilities (the relevant pension items) are recorded off balance sheet.
Pension assets (PA) are measured by their fair market value, while pension liabilities are 
calculated as the actuarial present value of the promised benefits outflows. This measure of 
the pension liability, also called the projected benefit obligation (PBO), takes into account 
the value at which the liability will ultimately be settled and views the company as a going 
concern. Funded status is calculated as the ratio between plan assets and plan liabilities (as 
measured by PBO). Companies are also required to calculate two other measures of the 
pension liability: the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) as the present value of the future 
obligation based on current salaries, and the vested benefit obligation (VBO) as the amount 
of the benefit obligation that does not depend on future service. Both ABO and VBO reflect a 
shutdown perspective and serve, respectively, as a base for the calculation of the additional 
contribution when severe underfunding occurs and, as the basis for the calculation of the 
variable premium to be paid to the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC).
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ERISA (1974) requires all companies to fund their defined benefit plans. Funding rules for 
corporate pension plans are, however, mandated by both ERISA and Section 412 of the tax 
code. To qualify for favorable tax treatment of contributions under the Internal Revenue 
Code, sponsoring companies must meet certain minimum funding requirements.6  Companies 
can fund their pension plans with cash, stock (own stock up to 10% of total plan assets) or 
debt investments as long as they are considered to be prudent.
The minimum contribution is contingent upon the funded status of the plan which is 
generally calculated under different assumptions than those used for financial reporting.7 It is 
equal to the pension obligation earned by employees during the year plus the level of 
underfunding amortized over 30 years, with two exceptions. First, no contribution is required 
when the plan is overfunded. Second, severely underfunded plans must comply with an 
additional funding requirement to reduce the funding deficiency within 3 to 5 years.8
Penalties for inadequate funding out of ongoing cash flows are triggered by ERISA. When 
a company fails to fulfill minimum funding requirements, ERISA requires that the shortfall
be covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). PBGC is empowered to 
6
Technically, there is also a maximum tax deductible contribution permitted by the IRS. This ceiling was 
established in response to a wave of pension plan terminations and pension plan assets reversions by sponsoring 
companies with overfunded plans. Companies with overfunded plans became very valuable targets in the 
takeover market. In 1990 an excise tax was imposed on any assets reversion or contribution exceeding the 
maximum allowed. The excise tax rate, which may be as high as 50 percent of the reversion, varies depending
upon whether or not the employer maintains a replacement plan or makes certain benefit increases. 
7Under SFAS 87, the high grade Corporate Bonds-Moody’s Aa is used as the discount rate in the PBO 
calculation, whereas the expected return for assets is used as the discount rate to calculate the minimum 
contribution.
8For a plan that is less than 90% funded, ERISA requires an additional contribution to the plan in order to 
reduce the funding deficiency within three to five years. There are exceptions, however. If a plan is over 80% 
funded today and was more than 90% funded for the past two years, the additional contribution requirement is 
waived. Furthermore, companies may request a hardship waiver or an extension period to meet the normal and 
additional contribution requirements. The additional cost incurred by underfunding is the premium to be paid to 
the PBGC. This consists of a fixed cost of $19 per employee plus a variable cost equal to $9 per $1,000 of 
underfunding.
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recover the pension deficit by filing a claim against the company’s assets that can amount to 
up to 30% of the firm’s net worth. Depending on the timing of the petition, this claim has 
either the status of a tax lien or of a secure claim on assets.9 Not surprisingly, companies with 
large underfunded plans were concerned during the bear market of 2000-2003, when low 
interest rates resulted in high values for the pension liability while the value of plan assets 
sank with the stock market.  On average, the ratio of the underfunding level to the market 
capitalization was about 21% over 1991-2003. The aggregate level of underfunding among 
all publicly traded companies totaled approximately $450 billion of dollars at the end of 2002
(figure 1). 
While the contribution to the pension plan flows as a deductible amount through taxable 
income, it is the pension cost that runs through the income statement and affects reported 
earnings. Large book to tax differences can therefore be triggered by contributions below or 
above costs. 
Companies have opposed expensing the underfunding level of their defined benefit plans 
because of the induced pension assets’ volatility on earnings. Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) allows several pension costs smoothing 
mechanisms. Pension cost is calculated as the normal cost (attributable to services rendered 
by employees during the period), plus interest cost (increase of the pension obligation due to 
9Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1342, the PBGC may initiate the termination of a pension plan if it determines that the 
plan has not met minimum finding requirements under §412 of the Internal Revenue Code, if the plan is unable 
to pay benefits when due or if the expected loss to PBGC is larger if the plan is not terminated. If the PBGC 
files and perfects a lien under 29 U.S.C. §1368(a) prior to the liable entity’s filing for bankruptcy protection, 
then PBGC’s claim is senior and must be satisfied in full before any distribution is made to unsecured creditors 
of the state. If, however, the liable entity has already filled for bankruptcy protection, PBGC asserts that the 
portion of its claim equal to the lien under 29 U.S.C. §1368 (a) is an administrative expense as a tax incurred by 
the estate under 11 U.S.C. §§503(b)(1)(B), 507(a)(1) and 29 U.S.C. §1368(a), (c)(2) and as a tax priority under 
11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8).  Any amount of PBGC's claim for unfunded benefit liabilities that is not entitled to 
priority is asserted as a general unsecured claim.  I thank Mr. Krettek Joseph, attorney at PBGC, for clarifying 
these issues.
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the passage of time), plus a transition asset amortization (at the date of the adoption of SFAS 
87)10, minus the expected returns on plan assets (instead of actual return). The last item is the 
major smoothing mechanism11. Any difference between actual and expected plan asset 
returns is transferred off balance sheet as unrecognized gains and losses, up to the point 
where it reaches a threshold (10% * max{PBO, Assets}), when it is allowed to be, again,
amortized. This is referred to as “the corridor” in SFAS 87. 
Because of these provisions, it is not uncommon for companies to report pension income 
as part of their operating income when, in fact, their pension plan funding has deteriorated. 
As a simple example, Boeing Company reported in 2003  pension liabilities of 
$39,931million and pension assets of $33,209 million (17% underfunded) while reporting on 
the income statement pension income of $67 million (negative pension cost). During the year 
the company contributed $1,728 million to its pension plan and reported net income of 718 
million. This example highlights how pension accounting deepens the book to tax income 
differences ($67 million plus $1,728 million, in this example). 
In Figure 1 I provide an aggregate picture of the underfunding levels relative to the 
amounts being recognized and unrecognized on the balance sheet. It is interesting to note that 
over the last years of the bear market (2000-2002), when underfunding reached a record 
level, companies still continued to show prepaid pension assets on their balance sheets. 
2.3. Disclosure
10This smoothing device allows amortizing benefits arising from the employee’s past services (plan adoption or 
subsequent plan amendments). Unrecognized prior service cost is amortized into the pension expense over the 
service life of employees.
11Gold (2003) comments on using expected returns rather than actual returns in the pension cost calculation: 
“FAS 87 conveniently allows corporations whose pension plans are invested in equities to take advance credit 
for higher anticipated earnings without conceding that they bear additional risk – tantamount to allowing risky 
mutual funds to report what they expect to earn on average, instead of what they actually earn each year.”
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The Financial Accounting Standards Board mandates that pension accounts be disclosed 
only in the footnotes of annual financial statements. SFAS 87, subsequently amended in 1998 
by SFAS 132, requires the disclosure of the major assumptions used for forecasting benefits 
(discount rate, rate of compensation increase) as well as assumptions on expected returns on 
plan assets. Firms are also required to provide a reconciliation of the beginning and ending 
balances for pension assets, pension liabilities, and plan status. Explicit disclosures of 
benefits paid and contributions made by employers became available starting with fiscal year 
1999. Although not available in the Compustat database, pension contributions can be 
estimated from other pension items that are disclosed on balance sheet (prepaid or accrued 
pension liability) and the income statement (pension cost/income). PA and PBO are 
explicitly disclosed, but data on the other two measures for the pension liability (ABO and 
VBO) are released only in exceptional cases.12
3. Integration of the firm with the defined benefit plan
Despite the fact that the firm and its DBPs are separate legal entities, it is arguable whether 
the laws governing the interaction between the corporate sponsor and its DBP prevent the 
integration of the entities’ balance sheets. In fact, the current legislation supports their 
integration, because firms are liable for all promised pension benefits. Whether paid out of 
cash flows or bankruptcy proceeds, the pension liability is senior to the claim of all lenders. 
Plan assets, although legally segregated and under the control of a trustee, also behave as 
corporate assets. Appreciations and depreciations in the value of the pension assets flow to 
the shareholders of the sponsoring company in the form of smaller or larger contributions. 
12For example, SFAS 132 requires ABO to be reported by companies whose pension plan assets fall below 
ABO, i.e., companies that are required to report a minimum liability adjustment on the balance sheet.
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Additional retirement benefits can be offered in exchange for lower current salary increases. 
The resulting financial slack can be used for reinvestment, dividends, share repurchases, or 
debt reduction. Companies also can access excess pension assets through plan terminations 
or conversions to cash balance plans13. In short, pension assets and pension liabilities behave 
as corporate assets and liabilities. Related to their governance, ERISA stipulates that the 
trustees of these plans be appointed by the plan sponsor. Trustees have a fiduciary duty to the 
plan participants, but their performance is subject to strong industry pressures. It is therefore 
clear to individual and institutional trustees that their continued employment is at the 
discretion of the plan sponsor. In other words, the corporate pension plan has many of the 
features of a fully owned financial subsidiary. 
Several empirical studies support this economic view on pension plans. For example,
Feldstein and Morck (1983), Landsman (1986), Barth (1991), and Barth, Beaver, and 
Landsman (1992) provide evidence that the market behaves as if pension assets and liabilities 
are corporate assets and liabilities. Barth (1991) examines which measure of the pension 
liability best reflects investors’ expectations. She finds that the fair market value of assets 
and PBO exhibit significantly less measurement error than the amounts presently recognized 
on balance sheet. Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1992) examine whether market participants 
assign different coefficients to pension cost components when determining security prices. 
They find that pension cost coefficients differ from one another and that the disclosure of 
separate components of costs is incrementally informative on the firm’s permanent earnings 
potential. Franzoni and Marin (2006) provide more recent evidence that the market does not 
anticipate the implication of current underfunding for future earnings and cash flows.
Mistaken 
13See, for e.g., Petersen (1992).
17
Recognizing that pension plans are essentially financial subsidiaries of the firm has several 
capital structure implications. First, it would be inappropriate to account only for the net 
pension asset or liability, because nowhere else on the balance sheet assets and liabilities are 
netted against each other, independent of the degree of immunization of the liabilities14. 
Second, unless the pension plan has a ratio of pension liabilities to pension assets below the 
sponsoring company leverage ratio, consolidated leverage will always be larger than the 
reported leverage.15 Third, the understatement of the leverage ratio increases with the size of 
the pension plan relative to its sponsor. Systematic differences in leverage ratios resulting 
from pension plans can potentially severely bias capital structure tests. Sponsoring 
companies are expected to be more leveraged on consolidated accounts, after the integration 
of corporate pension plans on their balance sheets as fully owned subsidiaries.
The tax treatment of pensions is directly linked to the capital structure debate on 
underleveraged capital structures. Sponsoring companies can use their discretion over the 
amounts of contributions to their pension plans, while simultaneously holding accounting 
earnings constant. By optimally timing their pension contributions companies can lower their 
marginal tax rates, therefore diminishing the tax incentives of debt. Pension contributions can 
be thought of as the equivalent of interest payments on debt16.
14Accounting only for the net position of the pension plan would also mask the company’s pension exposure. 
Two companies, otherwise identical except the size of their pension plan, could report similar level of 
underfunding, and show an identical impact on the balance sheet. Nonetheless, the company with the large 
pension plans is definitely more exposed to market movements (even without accounting for any potential 
differences in the volatility of assets and liabilities of the pension plan).
15(D+PL)/(A+PA)>D/A  PL/PA>D/A where D=Reported Book Debt, PL=Pension Liabilities, A=Corporate 
Assets, PA=Pension Assets. For instance, a fully funded pension plan with PA=PL will always increase 
leverage.
16Contributions to a DBP are different from contributions to a DCP because they are paid towards an
“obligation that leaves little or no discretion to avoid a future transfer of assets”. A salary payment (or similarly, 
a contribution towards a 401k account), creates no liability according to FASB definition because there is no 
18
The tax shield provided by pensions complements the tax shield provided by interest 
payments on debt, adding more support for the tradeoff theory. According to the static 
version of the tradeoff theory of capital structure, firms choose target debt ratios by trading 
off the tax benefits of debt against its costs. Whereas the benefits of debt are believed to be 
large due to the tax shield provided by interest deductions, there is no consensus on the size 
of the costs of debt, although they are believed to be small.17 Graham (2000) estimated that 
the typical firm could double its tax benefits by leveraging up to the point where the marginal 
tax benefit begins to decline. The pension obligation is a binding, long term obligation 
towards the employees that has most of the characteristics of debt. Provided that defined 
benefit plans are large relative to their sponsors, important tax savings are potentially derived 
through the corporate pension plans. If pension liabilities are treated as long term debt and 
pension contributions as the interest paid on this debt, the underleverage gap is expected to 
diminish.
The tradeoff theory predicts that firms have optimal capital structures. If pension liabilities 
are substituting for debt, then, companies sponsoring larger pension plans should use less 
debt financing then similar companies sponsoring smaller pension plans. 
Hypothesis: Relative to the set of non sponsoring companies, firms with large pension 
obligations undertake less debt.
obligating event. If the employee leaves the company, the obligation to pay a salary disappears, while the 
pension obligation remains.
17
 See, e.g., Opler and Titman (1994), Andrade and Kaplan (1998).
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  While the institutional setting of pension liabilities supports their integration into 
corporate liabilities, it is less clear whether corporate managers treat the pension obligation as 
a perfect substitute for debt. Nevertheless, a negative relationship between pension debt and 
book debt would provide evidence that firms consider DBPs when making capital structure 
decisions. This would be consistent with Rauh (2004), who finds that large required 
contributions affect investment policy, and also with Frank (2002), who finds a positive 
relationship between DBPs’ assets allocation in bonds and the firm’s tax benefits. 
4. Data and consolidated balance sheet issues
4.1 Data
The primary source of data in this analysis is Compustat’s Industrial (INA), Full Coverage 
(FCA) and Research (RES) files. This study covers the period 1991-2003, beginning with the 
year data on the pension cost component became available in Compustat and continuing 
through to the last year of available data as of the commencement of this study. Sponsoring 
pension plans are identified depending on whether pension assets and pension liabilities are
reported.18 Since the focus of this paper is on capital structure ratios and taxes, I exclude 
utilities (SIC code 49), financial firms (SIC codes between 60 and 64), and all firms with 
insufficient information to calculate leverage ratios. The first sample has 17,191 firm-year 
observations for sponsoring companies and 60,127 firm-year observations for non sponsoring 
companies. Untabulated results show that defined benefit plans are sponsored by 
industrialized and large, unionized companies such as automobile and construction materials
18Until 1998, sponsoring companies were required to disclose information separately for underfunded and 
overfunded plans. The aggregate level of pension assets is calculated as the sum of Pension Plan Assets of 
Overfunded Plans (Data287) and Pension Plan Assets of Underfunded Plans (Data296). The expected pension 
liabilities are calculated as the sum of the Pension Projected Benefit Obligation of Overfunded Plans (Data286)
and the Pension Projected Benefit Obligation of Underfunded Plans (Data294). 
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manufacturers, and DBPs are less prevalent in newer industries such as internet software and
telecommunications services. Despite a general increase of standard and distressed plan 
terminations in the recent years relative to the number of adoptions, the number of pension 
sponsoring companies is still large. Almost two thirds of the S&P500 firms currently sponsor 
corporate pension plans.
The magnitude of corporate pension plans is significant relative to the size of the
sponsoring companies (table 1). The aggregate ratio of plan assets to operating assets is on 
average 17.5% over the sample period. The number of sponsors decreases slightly over the 
period, from a peak of 1,430 sponsors in 1996 to 1,107 in 2003. Relative to total book debt, 
the pension liability is, on average, about 30%. Calculated as a percentage of adjusted 
operating income (EBIT plus pension cost), pension contributions account for 3.9%, while 
interest payments account for 11.8%. Another relevant ratio is the size of the contribution 
relative to the interest payment. Since some firms do not have long term debt on their balance 
sheet, I split the data depending on the availability of the interest on debt. The average ratio 
between the pension contribution and the interest on debt averages 81% for the subsample of 
interest paying firms.19
A second sample is used in the simulation of marginal tax rates (MTRs). The data are also 
extracted from Compustat, but different filters are applied. I require that sufficient current 
and past data exist in order to simulate taxable income. The second sample comprises 18,558 
firm-year observations for sponsoring companies and 61,524 firm-year observations for non 
sponsoring companies and does not necessarily overlap with the first sample.
19Only companies with reported interest on debt greater than $10,000 are considered. When modifying this 
restriction to $100,000, the ratio between pension contribution and interest changes to 63%. Also, note that the 
reported ratio of the contribution to the interest is calculated as a cross sectional average of the ratio rather than 
the ratio of the cross sectional means of the contribution and interest expense. 
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4.2 Reported and consolidated leverage
I create consolidated balance sheets by integrating off balance sheet pension assets and 
liabilities with the reported corporate assets and liabilities. I proceed by identifying the few 
pension items already reflected on the balance sheet. The prepaid pension cost represents the 
cumulative employer contributions in excess over accrued net pension cost. The accrued 
pension cost represents cumulative pension cost in excess of employer’s contributions.20  If a
company sponsors only one pension plan, one of these two items appears on the balance 
sheet.  For severely underfunded plans, where ABO exceeds the fair value of assets, FASB 
mandates a minimum balance sheet liability (AML) equal to their difference. The increased 
liability is directly reflected in the accrued pension cost, and it is offset by an increase in 
intangible assets.  However, if the unrecognized prior service cost is below the AML, the 
difference is directly charged to equity (as part of the comprehensive income).21 The numbers
shown in the pension footnote are pretax amounts. The actual charge to shareholders’ equity 
is taken on an after tax basis, with the difference charged to deferred taxes.  Where the AML 
data are available, I calculate the deferment as the disclosed AML times the maximum
statutory rate and add this amount to total liabilities. 
In panel C of table 1 I provide an example of how the adjustment process should be carried 
out (General Motors, 2001 year end balance sheet).  GM sponsors a large pension plan, with 
pension assets that equal 23% of the company assets, and liabilities that equal approximately
20If prepaid pension cost (Data290) and accrued pension cost (Data300) were available for a firm, then both 
items are used separately to adjust the balance sheet. After 1998, only the net amount is reported, and 
consequently this was the amount used for adjustment.
21The presumption is that the serious underfunding resulted from “sweetened benefits” to maintain the 
employee morale.
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28% of reported liabilities. The plan is severely underfunded, and consequently an AML 
adjustment takes place. While the balance sheet pension accounts show only a pension deficit 
of $3.30 billion (the net amount between prepaid and accrued pension cost), the pension plan 
is in fact underfunded by $12.6 billion.22 The net worth of the company vanishes once GM
acknowledges its pension liability towards its employees.23 The book leverage ratio rises 
from 39% (unconsolidated) to 53% (consolidated) and a more leveraged company emerges 
from the consolidated balance sheet.
In this paper, leverage ratios are calculated on reported (balance sheet) and consolidated 
accounts. Book leverage is calculated as the ratio of long term debt to the book value of 
assets. Long term debt is calculated as the amount of obligations due more than one year 
from the company’s balance sheet plus the current portion of the long term debt.24 Market 
leverage is calculated as the ratio of long term debt to the market value of the company. 
Market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets, minus book equity plus the 
market value of equity. On consolidated accounts, I treat the pension liability (PBO) as a 
22According to current accounting rules, GM recognized on the balance sheet pension-related assets, of about 
$32.9 billion at the end of 2005, while other post-retirement benefits, such as health care expenses for retirees, 
of about $34.1 billion liability. These amounts do not correspond to the assets and liabilities in GM’s plans - a 
disconnect that FASB plans to change starting with all fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006. 
According to the new rules, GM will have to show on the balance sheet the current level of underfunding of 
$4.6 billion on its pension plans and $64.5 billion on its other post-retirement benefits.
23For expositional purposes the amounts are retrieved from year 2001 annual report. Compustat database 
provides only the net value of the recognized asset (liability) and the AML. Leverage ratios are similar when 
calculated based on netted amounts. The contention is that on aggregate, while small differences in leverage 
could occur due to differences in reporting between Compustat and the actual annual reports, no systematic 
error will be made.
24Relative to lease financing, the paper incorporates all capital leases as long term debt, as most of them are 
treated as true leases (i.e. debt) for tax purposes. With true leases the lessor purchases the asset and deducts both 
the depreciation and the interest from taxable income. While capital leases are already integrated onto the 
balance sheet, operating leases are off balance sheet items. This paper does not integrate operating leases 
because the issue of whether debt and operating leases are substitutes is still debatable. 
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long term liability. Book equity is redefined as consolidated assets minus consolidated total 
liabilities.
Reported and adjusted leverage ratios are reported in table 2. Both book and market 
leverage ratios increase after adjustment by about 35%. Book leverage increases from 0.26 to 
0.35, while market leverage increases from 0.20 to 0.27. The differences between reported 
and consolidated leverage for the subset of sponsoring firms are shown in figure 2. 
Differences are always negative, because leverage increases almost by definition once a fully 
owned subsidiary is integrated (see footnote 16).There is a sharp increase in consolidated 
leverage over 2002-2003, when firms reported record levels of underfunding. Although on 
aggregate, pension plans were also underfunded in 1993 (see figure 1), they were probably 
less exposed to market movements because they had a smaller proportion of their portfolios 
weights invested in equities. Overall, while sponsoring companies derived important tax 
benefits from debt relative to non sponsoring companies, they also realized important tax 
savings from sponsoring corporate pension plans (table 2 and figure 2). 
Sponsoring firms differ from non sponsoring firms on several other dimensions (table 3, 
panel A). Sponsoring companies are larger (as measured by book assets) and more profitable, 
with fewer investment opportunities (low market to book ratios), fewer intangible assets and 
more collateral, lower bankruptcy risk, and higher marginal tax rates. These are 
characteristics that are also shared by firms with large amounts of debt in their capital 
structure (table 3, panel B). This provides preliminary evidence that pension liabilities and 
debt are similar financial instruments. It is also relevant to note that although sponsoring 
companies appear to be more levered than the set of non-sponsoring companies (table 3, 
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panel A), their marginal tax rates (before and after financing) are larger, suggesting that these 
companies are more underlevered, and leave more tax benefits on the table than the rest.
5. Refinement of marginal tax rates and recalculation of the tax benefits of debt
5.1. Research design
Graham (2000) quantifies the tax advantage of debt at the firm level. He defines the tax 
benefit function as a series of marginal tax rates, each corresponding to a specific level of 
interest deductions. If firms balance the tax benefits of debt against the cost of financial 
distress, as predicted by the tradeoff theory, firms should operate on the downward sloping 
part of their tax benefit functions. Graham’s study finds that firms use debt conservatively 
and that, during 1980-1994, the typical firm could add 15.7% to the firm value by leveraging
up to the point where the tax benefit function starts declining. Extending the analysis several 
years into the future, he suggests that the typical firm could have added interest deductions 
with tax benefits equal to 10.4% of firm value, above their current level of tax benefits, 
during 1990-1999.25
I simulate marginal tax rates (MTRs) following the same methodology as in Shevlin 
(1990) and Graham (1996a, 1996b, 2000, 2004) but modified for the tax treatment of 
pensions. The marginal tax rate calculation relies on the simulation of taxable income, which 
is neither disclosed nor easily inferred. There are several reasons why taxable income does 
not equal financial accounting earnings, such as the impact of deferred taxes, stock options 
and tax credits. A good review of the book to tax income differences is provided in Hanlon 
25In his survey paper, Graham (2003) extends his previous calculation of tax benefits of debt over 1995-1999 
(footnote 12). When combined with the results in Graham (2000), the average value loss due to conservative 
debt policy amounts to approximatively 10.4% of firm value over the period 1990-1999.
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(2003). Graham, Lang, and Shackelford (2004) examine the effects of expensing stock 
options on marginal tax rates on the subset of S&P100 and NASDAQ100 firms. Although
options granted or to be granted are not considered debt-like instruments for a company 
because of their uncertain exercise, the pension liability is a long term commitment to the 
employees.26 The subsequent analysis is based on the premise that sponsoring companies 
achieve tax benefits from two sources of debt: bondholders, and employees (through the 
pension contribution). The consolidated (aggregate) interest expense is therefore calculated 
as the sum of the regular interest expense and the pension contribution.
In addition, the accounting treatment of pensions introduces another divergence between 
accounting income and taxable income, a feature that has not been previously considered. 
Pension cost (or income) is included as an operating expense, and therefore is a component 
of income before interest and taxes. Despite its financial accounting treatment, it is not 
deductible for tax purposes. Only the pension contribution receives a favorable tax treatment.
While differences between pension cost and pension contributions contribution deepen the 
difference between taxable and accounting income it is in fact the contribution that affects
MTRs. Firm’s discretion over pension contributions affects the timing of tax payments.
Appendix 1 explains in detail the simulation of MTRs. Marginal tax rates are defined as 
the present value of the tax obligation from earning an extra dollar today. Taxes are not paid 
in all states of nature, and given the possibility of carrying losses backward or forward, the 
probability that taxes will be paid in the future must also be considered. The dynamic nature 
of the tax code as well as the uncertainty about future earnings renders any current proxy for 
MTRs (such as taxes paid) ineffective. A forecasting model of earnings is required, and I 
26Although the exercise of the stock options creates corporate income deductions, it is difficult to argue that 
stock options can be integrated into the balance sheet in the same manner pension plans can.
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adopt the standard approach of assuming that earnings follow a random walk with drift.  I 
calculate the adjusted operating income as the accounting earnings plus the reported pension 
cost, minus grossed up deferred taxes, plus interest expense, minus the contribution 
expense27. In general, EBIT as reported in the income statement overstates (understates) the 
true operating income when the pension expense is below (above) the pension contribution. 
Pension contributions are estimated as the pension expense (income) less the change in the 
balance sheet liability, where the change in the balance sheet is calculated as the closing 
balance addresses sheet liability (assets) minus the beginning balance sheet liability (asset).28
An example of this calculation is provided in Appendix 2, for AMR Corporation (the parent 
of American Airlines).
I refine the marginal tax rate calculation using three different measures: MTRnone is 
calculated before aggregate financing (debt or pension), MTRint is calculated after debt 
financing, and MTRall is calculated after aggregate financing. Due to the book tax difference 
introduced by pension treatment, none of these measures is directly comparable with 
Graham’s (1996a, 2000, and 2004).
I proceed by calculating the tax benefits of aggregate debt by integrating the area below 
the benefit function up to the point of the aggregate interest expense. The present value of tax 
benefits from current and future deductions is calculated under the assumption that tax 
shields are perpetual, using Moody’s average bond yield as a discount rate. I also follow 
27Relative to operating leases, I follow the same approach as in Graham, Lemmon and Schallheim (1998) and 
add back one third of the rental expense to earnings in order to account for the proportion of the rental payment 
that is not due to depreciation. Interest expense is calculated as data15 plus 1/3 of data47.
28More specifically, pension contributions are estimated as sum between Pension cost (Data295) plus the change 
in the Prepaid/Accrued Pension Cost (Data290). Where the calculated pension contribution appears to be 
negative, it is assumed to be zero. Note that Compustat reports the Balance Sheet Recognized Amount as 
Prepaid/Accrued Pension cost (the two items are generally different if an AML exist). An example is provided 
in Appendix 2 while section 7 describes potential biases.
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Graham’s (2000) convention of defining the point where the MTR function starts declining 
as the “kink”. More specifically, the kink is defined as the ratio of the amount of interest 
required to make the tax function slope downward to actual interest expense. The kink 
increases with debt conservatism. A kink greater than one implies that the company could 
derive a tax shield equal to the statutory rate, for an additional dollar of interest deduction.
5.2. Simulation results
The importance of pensions in the MTR calculations is highlighted in the following
example (figure 3). Pepsi Bottling Company sponsored a large pension plan that was severely 
underfunded at the end of 2002. Due to a large deficit reduction requirement, the pension 
contribution greatly exceeded pension cost in 2002 and was also expected to be large in the 
next few years. Its effect on current and expected future income is reflected in lower 
marginal tax rates. The consolidated interest expense (pension contribution plus interest 
expense) also shifts to the right, highlighting the additional tax benefits associated with 
pensions. The size of the tax benefit associated with the pension plan is calculated by 
integrating the area below the tax benefits function calculated with pensions and in between 
the debt interest expense and the aggregate interest expense. While Pepsi Bottling Group 
shows slightly smaller tax benefits of debt due to lower MTRs, the total tax savings from 
pensions are quite large. Similar to any voluntary deductions, there is a tradeoff between high 
deductions at low MTRs and low deductions at high MTRs. 
It is important to note that the company operates on the downward part of the tax benefit 
function (point C), whereas before accounting for pensions the company was operating on 
28
the flat segment of its tax benefit function (point A), which would have qualified it as 
conservative in its debt policy.
The aggregate effect of pension contribution deductibility on marginal tax rates is shown 
in table 4 and figure 4. The mean difference between MTRint and MTRall is economically 
small (less than 1%). There are two potential explanations for this finding. First, while 
taxable income will always be smaller than accounting income when firms disclose a pension 
income29 or contributions above the pension expense, firms can contribute less than the 
reported cost, in which case the relation between taxable and accounting income reverses. On 
average, this can result in an insignificant change in MTRs. Second, sponsoring companies 
are large, industrialized companies with high historical return on assets. Their marginal tax 
rate curve is flat even for significant deductions, in which case pension contributions are not 
sufficient to decrease MTRs. These companies most likely still operate on the flat segment of 
their tax benefit functions even after taking pensions into account. 
On aggregate, the tax benefits derived from pensions are important (table 5). The ratio of 
the present value of tax benefits from aggregate debt to balance sheet debt is 1.47, while the 
ratio of pension contributions to the interest expense is 1.5930. Firms appear to be less 
conservative with their debt policy once pension liabilities are accounted for. The capitalized 
tax benefits of debt, expressed as a percentage of firm value are reported in table 6. Tax 
savings associated with pensions amount to 3% of book assets and 2% of the market value of 
the firm. Pensions increase tax savings by 26% (see figure 5). Using the kink as a measure of 
29Firms reporting high accounting earnings can in fact pay little taxes in this instance. Similarly, firms making 
large contributions to the pension plans, higher than the calculated pension cost, decrease their tax bills 
significantly.
30The ratio of 1.59 differs from 1.81 as reported in table 1 because of the differences in the two samples. The 
first sample focuses on leverage ratio and consolidated balance sheet issues, whereas the second sample relies 
on the availability of data required to simulate taxable income.
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the level of underleverage, I find that the underleverage gap is reduced by 31% 31 as measured 
by the change in kink (table 3 and 5). The higher level of the aggregate interest expense, 
combined with the effect of the pension contribution on MTRs, diminishes the potential tax 
benefits from the issuance of additional debt, narrowing the underleverage gap32. It is 
important also to contrast this result with the percentage change in the kink of about 20% that 
Graham, Lang and Shackelford (2004) attribute to stock option deductions. Pension 
contributions appear to be at least as important as stock options in explaining underleverage.
It is interesting that although the tax benefits for the average firm increase by 25% to 27%
(table 5), the present value of the tax benefits adds 2% to 3% to the firm’s value, which is 
about one fourth of the potential tax benefit of debt for a typical firm during the 1990s. A
Pearson correlation matrix of the percentage change in tax benefits and several firm 
characteristics shows that among the group of firms with pension plans, the largest benefits 
are achieved by big firms with lower leverage. 
6. Interdependence between the pension liability and the balance sheet debt
6.1. Econometric model
In this section I examine the relationship between the size of the pension liability and the 
amount of balance sheet debt. Treating corporate pension plans as wholly owned subsidiaries 
suggests some degree of substitutability between the two obligations. In the tradeoff theory 
framework, firms set target capital structures after balancing the costs against the benefits of 
their different debt obligations. Pension debt and balance sheet debt provide similar tax 
31Underleverage is calculated as the kink minus 1. The change in underleverage is therefore calculated as [(2.0-
1.0)-(1.7-1.0)]/(2.0-1.0).
32Note that the kink will always decrease after accounting for pension, because contributions are always 
positive. 
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incentives while having a similar impact on the probability of financial distress. Companies 
sponsoring relatively large defined benefit plans should therefore have lower balance sheet 
debt. 
Nevertheless, prior research suggests that firms care about balance sheet treatment and 
very often structure transactions to keep liabilities off balance sheet. For example, Shevlin 
(1987) suggests that firms use off balance sheet financing (R&D limited partnerships) to 
avoid the possible cost of bond covenant violations. Engel, Erickson, and Maydew (1999) 
find that firms incur substantial costs in order to manage their balance sheets when they 
reclassify debt into trust preferred stock.33 For similar reasons, managers of pension 
sponsoring companies might not treat contingent pension liabilities as a perfect substitute for 
contractual debt liabilities, and therefore they might undertake more debt in their capital 
structure than the theory would predict. 
The decision to become or to remain a pension plan sponsor generally coincides with the 
choice of a balance sheet capital structure. Since not all companies have the potential to 
sustain current and future required contributions or to cope with the volatility of pension 
assets and liabilities, the self selection process needs to be integrated into the econometric 
framework. To test the importance of pension liabilities in capital structure decisions, I 
propose the following model: 
itttit XaZaaDBP +++= 12110*    (Self selection equation)
1=itDBP  if 0* >itDBP and 0=itDBP  if 0* itDBP
ittitit XccPENSIONDBP ++=> 221* *:0 (Pension benefits equation)
33Trust preferred stock, first issued in 1993, was designed to be treated as preferred stock for financial purposes 
and as debt for tax purposes (i.e., payments on trust preferred stock are deductible by the issuer).
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ittititit XbPENSIONDBPbDBPbbLEV ++++= 33321 *** (Capital structure equation)
where the latent variable *itDBP is the expected net benefit from sponsoring the corporate 
pension plan, PENSIONit is the expected pension obligation (normalized by consolidated 
assets), and LEVit is the long term balance sheet debt (normalized by consolidated assets). 
The error terms ( ititit  ,, ) are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution. While 
the capital structure equation is the focus of the analysis, the self selection equation 
eliminates any selectivity bias concern and the pension benefits equation controls for any 
endogeneity issues between the balance sheet debt and pension debt.
The net benefit of sponsoring a pension plan is unobservable, and therefore the selection 
equation cannot be directly estimated. However, firms become sponsors when the net benefit 
is positive and choose not to become sponsors when the net benefit is negative, a binary 
choice that is observable. Consequently, I define the binary variable itDBP as equal to one 
when a pension plan is adopted and zero otherwise.
The structure of the model is common to many labor economics applications (see, for 
instance, Killingworth (1983), Killingworth and Heckman (1986), and Mroz (1987)).34 The 
estimation procedure is summarized as follows. In the first stage, I jointly estimate the net 
benefit of sponsoring a DBP and the size of pension benefits in a self selection model
framework, using a Heckman two-stage procedure (and alternatively maximum likelihood). 
The set of independent variables X1 and Z1 are separated out based on their inclusion in the 
pension benefit size equation. Z1 is a vector of identification variables in the selection 
34One classic application of this methodology in labor economics focuses on the estimation of the individual 
supply of hours of work, given their participation in the work force and the endogeneity of wages.
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equation, whereas X1 is a vector of independent variables being used in both the selection and 
the pension benefit size equation. Fitted values of pension benefits are, therefore, derived 
from a selectivity-bias corrected pension benefit equation. In the second stage, I jointly 
estimate the net benefits of being a pension plan sponsor and the amount of debt undertaken 
on the balance sheet in a treatment effects model, using predicted pension benefits instead of 
actual pension liability. The variable LEVit is modeled as a function of the binary choice 
DBPit, the predicted level of the pension obligation PENSIONit and the observed variables X3.
The methodology described above corresponds primarily to the two-stage least squares
(2SLS) technique to correct for endogeneity, except for the self selection adjustment. As in 
the case of the 2SLS, this procedure generates incorrect estimates of the variance-covariance 
matrix because the estimate of the error term variance is computed using residuals calculated 
with estimated, rather than actual values of the endogenous variables. In order to correctly 
estimate standard errors, the entire system of equations is bootstrapped. 
6.2. Empirical results
In this section, I describe the variables as well as the results of the estimation. Early work 
on the motivation to sponsor defined benefits plans focused on labor incentives. Ippolito 
(1985) found that defined benefit plans create strong incentives for workers to remain with 
the firm because they suffer wealth losses if they quit early. Mitchell (1982), and Shiller and 
Weiss (1979) found that sponsoring firms have low employee turnover. Industries that 
require more human capital investment in their employees that is not easily transferable are 
more likely to adopt a defined benefit plan. I use the sponsor’s industry two-digit SIC code to 
control for the labor market characteristics faced by the firm. The number of employees also 
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plays an important role in both the selection of the plan and the size of benefits, because of 
the large fixed cost entailed by such a decision. 
In a related study, Petersen (1994) examines the role of operating leverage in the firm’s 
pension choice. He finds that financial characteristics of the sponsor influence the type of 
pension plan offered by the company. Although companies are more flexible in making 
payments towards their pension obligations, minimum required contributions still restrict 
their flexibility, similar to interest payments on debt. Therefore both the level and the 
volatility of the firm’s profitability should influence the amount of retirement benefits offered 
to the employees. If the costs of financial distress resulting from the less flexible cost 
structure imposed by minimum pension payments are large, firms are more likely to 
substitute DBPs for DCPs. To address this issue, I include the market to book ratio (proxy for 
growth opportunities) as an explan atory variable in predicting pension plan choice and size. 
Older plans are more likely to accumulate more pension benefits, and therefore I include in 
the pension size equation the age of the plan, as proxied by the number of years with 
available pension data on Compustat. To incorporate the aggregate shift from defined benefit 
plans to defined contribution plans, I also include in the estimation the year the firm adopted 
the plan.
While the identification of the system could be achieved through the nonlinearity 
introduced by the maximum likelihood estimation of the selection equation, exclusively 
relying on the functional form could lead to very imprecise estimators. The degree of 
unionization in the industry is an appealing instrument in the pension selection equation. An 
organized labor force has negotiation power over the adoption of a pension plan and can 
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hinder the termination of a corporate pension plan. However, the percentage of unionized 
workers should be uncorrelated to the size of pension benefits.
The results of the selection model estimation are presented in table 6, panel A. As 
expected, firms are more likely to adopt a pension plan when they come from more unionized 
industries and when they have a larger labor force. These firms also have larger returns on 
assets (ROA) and have less volatile cash flows. Surprisingly, the size of pension benefits is 
negatively related to profitability. Therefore, while sponsoring companies appear to be more 
profitable on average, large pension obligations negatively affect the profitability of the 
enterprise, possibly because large cash outflows are diverted from the main activity of the 
company. The age of the plan has the predicted sign and is significant; however the year of 
adoption does not affect the size of benefits. Predicted values for the pension liability size are 
calculated and used in table 6 panel B in order to correct for the potential endogeneity 
between book and pension debt.
The treatment effects model, which is estimated in table 6, panel B, is the main focus of 
this section. The model captures the effect pension obligations on the amount of debt issued 
by the sponsoring company. Besides the pension choice variable, DBP, and the predicted 
pension liability, 
^
PENSION , several other factors that the literature has found important in 
capital structure decisions (Graham (1996a), and Rajan and Zingales (1995)) are used as 
explanatory variables: the marginal tax rate before financing, the size of the firm as proxied 
by book assets, the market to book ratio, the ex-post probability of distress as proxied by 
ZSCORE35, the operating profit volatility, and the level of tangible assets.
35ZSCORE is a modified version of the Altman’s (1968) Z-score. A high level indicated a low level of financial 
distress. It is calculated as (3.3*data170+data12+1.4*data36+1.2(data4-data5))/data6.
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I find a negative and significant coefficient on pension liabilities equal to -0.36, suggesting 
that pension liabilities are important in capital structure decisions. However, the estimated 
coefficient is less than 1, implying that managers only partially substitute book debt for 
pension debt. There are several potential explanations for this finding. One possibility is that 
the disclosed measure of the pension liability is a very noisy measure of the true liability, and 
therefore the coefficient could be biased downward. Alternatively, it could be the effect of 
the insurance protection provided by the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation in case of 
financial distress, because a company in bankruptcy proceedings holds a put option on these 
liabilities. Pension accounting also gives managers considerable discretion to manipulate 
earnings and issue equity on more favorable terms, diluting the effect of pension liabilities on 
balance sheet debt. As previous research has suggested, firms care about balance sheet 
treatment and very often incur substantial costs structuring transactions that keep liabilities 
off balance sheet. For these reasons, managers of pension sponsoring companies might not 
treat contingent pension liabilities as a perfect substitute for contractual debt liabilities, and 
therefore they might undertake more debt in their capital structure than the theory would 
predict. 
Pension items as disclosed in Compustat provide combined figures for both domestic and 
foreign pension plans. In most countries, pension plan contributions are deductible in the 
place where they are originated. However, differences in the tax code or in the legal 
environment could affect the weight that the parent company place on these pension 
obligations. This issue is not specific to pensions, but it is common to most financial 
disclosures of multinational companies (e.g. interest on debt36). While domestic and foreign 
36Most studies assume that the total interest expense can be deducted from earnings, although tax rules require 
multinational firms to allocate a portion of interest expense to their foreign income.
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subsidiaries are consolidated for financial reporting purposes, they are subject to different 
rules for tax purposes. To check whether foreign pension liabilities are treated differently for 
capital structure purposes, I separate companies that have at least 10% of their sales coming 
from their non-domestic geographical segment37. I interact Dummy (Foreign Income) with 
predicted pension liabilities. The results are presented in Table 5, panel B. The results 
confirm that pension liabilities for companies with both domestic and foreign pension plan 
have a lower impact on the debt policy of the parent (the coefficient is -0.412+0.137= -
0.275). 
7. Limitations
The interpretation of the results is conditional on a few caveats. First, measurement error 
in the pension liability limits the analysis on consolidated leverage ratios. Nonetheless, any 
capital structure test that relies on the use of book debt leverage ratios is subject to the same 
criticism. In addition, the few pension items being reflected on the corporate balance sheet 
(e.g., prepaid pension cost, accrued liability, and intangible assets) are very often disclosed as 
a net amount, impeding the accounts consolidation. Despite these limitations, the 
recalculation of the MTRs and of the tax benefits associated with pensions relies on the level 
of pension contributions and it is unaffected by the assumptions embedded into the projected 
benefit obligation. Second, as in all papers that rely on the estimation of taxable income, the 
calculation of MTRs is affected by unobservable deductions. Third, because the current 
pension disclosure is for the consolidated company, it is not possible to separate out foreign 
37While this makes intuitive sense, I calculate the correlation between the ratio of foreign to domestic 
contributions and the ratio between foreign to domestic sales for the subset of companies from S&P100 that 
sponsor foreign pension plans. The Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.30 and statistically significant.
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pension plans that are subject to foreign pension regulations and not ERISA. Finally, this
paper does not address the personal tax penalty on holding bonds.38 However, while investors 
might be tax disadvantaged when buying bonds, the before tax interest income from pension 
plan investment in bonds flows through the income statement of the sponsoring company and 
it is taxed at the equity income rate.
To address concerns related to the use of Compustat database for accounts consolidation or 
for the estimation of pension contributions, I compare Compustat with two alternative data 
sources. As a robustness check, data is hand collected for all companies included in S&P100 
index in 2003. 85 companies out of 100 sponsor defined benefit plans and only 25 have 
foreign pension plans. The first alternative source is the 10-k footnote disclosure on defined 
benefit plans. SFAS 132 (1998) requires employers to explicitly disclose contributions made 
to all pension plans during the fiscal year, as well as a detailed description of the calculation 
of any balance sheet recognized amount. The same accounting standard requires that foreign 
plans not to be combined with any U.S plans.39 Calculated on this more refined description of 
accounts, consolidated book leverage appears to be 100 basis points larger than when 
calculated using the condensed data in Compustat while the consolidated market leverage 
remains unchanged. Estimated contributions appear not to be significantly different from 
those that are hand collected40. The other alternative data source for pension contributions is 
38Interest income is taxed as ordinary income, and therefore investors require higher returns for holding debt 
relative to equity. This provides a disincentive to issuing more debt at the corporate level and partially offsets 
the corporate tax advantage to debt. 
39Unless the benefit obligations of foreign pension plans is insignificant relative to the total benefit obligation 
and those plans use significantly different assumptions.
40The largest differences between estimated contributions and 10-k disclosed contributions are due to coding 
errors in Compustat. AML (additional minimum liability) is often missing in Compustat. Also, three coding 
errors have been discovered on the recording of the prepaid/accrued pension cost during 2002. Other possible 
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Form 5500 which is filed by each sponsor with the Department of Labor for each plan 
individually. While contributions on these forms would provide the exact amounts that are 
tax deductible at plan level, identifying all pension plans corresponding to a consolidated 
entity (or the fiscal year contributions are applied to) is difficult41. On the subsample of firms 
for which the data is hand collected, only 58 companies out of 85 could be found, and for this 
subset the aggregated level of contributions is statistically different from that collected from 
10-k statement. But more importantly, identifying the component of the pension cost 
(income) that would correspond to these plans is not disclosed in these forms and this is an 
important component in the MTRs’ calculations.
8. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that firms are less underleveraged once off balance sheet 
assets and liabilities are integrated into the balance sheet. Consistent with the pension 
literature that argues that property rights for pension assets and liabilities lie with the firm, I 
integrate pensions into the corporate balance sheet as fully leveraged subsidiaries. I regard
the pension liability as a long term binding obligation of the firm, similar to long term debt. 
Pension contributions are also regarded as the equivalent of interest payments on debt from a 
tax perspective.
I examine the effect of pension contributions on marginal tax rates and the magnitude of 
tax benefits derived from pensions. Following the methodology described in Shevlin (1990) 
deviations from the actual amounts are due to foreign exchange rates or acquisitions, but these items are not 
disclosed. 
41After 1998, Form 5500 can only be linked to Compustat through the EIN (employer identification number). 
The sponsoring entity could be a controlled subsidiary choosing to file taxes separately from the parent 
(therefore having a different EIN). Subsidiaries that are at least 80% owned by the parent have the option to file 
for taxes separately, while still consolidated with the parent company for financial purposes. Another 
complication arises when the plan year is different from the fiscal company. 
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and Graham (2000), I recalculate marginal tax rates, accounting for the tax treatment of 
pensions. Since pension cost is reported as a component of operating income but is not 
deductible for tax purposes, pension accounting introduces another source of divergence 
between accounting income and taxable income.
I find that firms are significantly more leveraged on consolidated financial statements, and 
that the size of pension plan contributions is 59% of the size of interest payments on debt. 
The tax benefits of debt increase by 47% once pensions are taken into account. Pension 
contributions account for 2% of the market value of the company, an increase of 26% from 
the amount accounted by interest deductions. I estimate that the underleverage gap closes by 
31% once pension assets and liabilities are considered.
This study complements Graham, Lang, and Shackelford (2004), who find significant 
effects of stock option deductions on marginal tax rates for NASDAQ 100 firms, the most 
profitable and stable among the high growth technology firms. By contrast, this study 
examines pension plan sponsors, which are also large, profitable firms from stable industries, 
with fewer growth opportunities. 
 Finally, I examine whether corporate managers treat pension obligations as corporate 
liabilities. I find that a 1 percentage point increase in the pension liability to total assets ratio 
is associated with a 0.36 percentage point decrease of debt to total assets ratio. This finding
provides evidence that firms integrate their pension plans into their corporate financial 
policy, and it is consistent with Rauh (2004) and Frank’s (2002) empirical results.
Overall, the results contribute directly to the debate on corporate capital structure and 
imply that once pension obligations are taken into account, firms are significantly less 
underlevered than previous estimates suggest. Further, since pension obligations vary 
40
systematically across companies and are prevalent among large and stable companies, failure 
to incorporate these off balance sheet liabilities can induce biases in tests of capital structure 
theories. 
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Appendix I:
Estimation of the corporate marginal tax rate
Marginal tax rates are simulated following the same methodology as in Shevlin (1990) and 
Graham (1996a, 1996b, 2000, 2004). Marginal tax rates (MTRs) are defined as the present 
value of the tax obligation from earning an extra dollar today. MTRs are affected by the 
uncertainty of future earnings, by certain provisions of the tax code (e.g., the possibility to 
carry losses back and forward) and by the progressive nature of the statutory tax code.  The 
dynamic nature of the tax code as well as the uncertainty about future earnings renders any 
current proxy for MTRs (such as taxes paid) ineffective.
 I adopt the standard approach and assume that earnings follow a random walk with drift.42
Reported earnings before interest and taxes are adjusted for the tax treatment of pensions. I 
calculate the adjusted operating income as the accounting earnings plus the reported pension 
cost, minus grossed up deferred taxes, plus interest expense, minus contribution expense.43
The main model of earnings forecasting is:
itiitEBIT µ +=	 
  ,
42Whether earnings really follow a random walk with drift has been tested in the literature, with inconclusive 
results. Graham (1996b) examines this hypothesis by examining the tax status (positive or negative taxable
income) persistence probabilities as a means of characterizing the time series pattern of data. He concludes that 
the hypothesis seems unreasonable for unprofitable firms due to the survivorship problem in the sample. He 
therefore proposes a pseudo random walk with drift, where the drift is constrained to be greater than or equal to 
zero, and shows that this model predicts the marginal tax rate better than a mean reverting process.
43Another alternative for calculating operating income would be to add back pension expense and subtract from 
it the service cost. The service cost is the only component of the expense related to the service rendered by 
employees during the current year. The other components, the expected return on assets for example, are a 
major component of pension expense, but represent market driven expectations rather than the cost of providing 
benefits. When the pension asset portfolio performs well, this component turns the pension expense into 
pension income, highly overstating the earnings. If this approach were used, the service cost would have to be 
subtracted back after earnings are simulated, because it is not tax deductible. 
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where itEBIT 
	  is the first difference in adjusted earnings, iµ is the drift, and it  is 
distributed normally with mean zero and variance equal to that of  itEBIT 
	 . The means and 
variances are updated for every year on a “rolling historical basis”. Current year taxable 
income is calculated as the adjusted earnings plus extraordinary or discontinued items, minus 
pension contribution, minus the deferred tax expense, with the latter term divided by the 
appropriate statutory tax rate so that it is expressed on a pre-tax basis. The net operating 
losses (NOLs), data item reported in Compustat (data42) has many missing observations. I 
assume the reported amount of carryforwards for 1980, if available, or carryforwards equal to 
zero if there is missing information, and start accumulating losses from that point forward. 
The forecasting period is equal to the number of years the legislation allows for carrying 
forward any losses (currently 20 years). The dynamic feature of the tax code is incorporated
only through the NOLs. Investment tax credits have been shown in Graham (1996a) to have a 
small effect on marginal tax rates and that alternative minimum tax (AMT) has been 
abolished in 2001. The approach undertaken in this paper is therefore closer to the one used 
in Shevlin (1990).
For losses incurred in tax years before 1997, a firm can carry losses back for 3 years and 
forward for 15 years. The legislation has subsequently changed, and the limits have been 
modified to (-2, +20) from 1997 to 2000, and to (-5, +20) from 2001 to 2003. Beginning in
2003, losses may again be carried back only for 2 years. Using the progressive nature of 
corporate tax schedule, I calculate the present value of the tax bill, having as a discount rate 
the average corporate bond yield. The past three years’ losses are not discounted, provided 
that interest is not paid on any tax refunds. I then add $10000 to year t income, and I 
recalculate the new tax liability. The difference between the two tax bills represents the 
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present value of an additional dollar earned, which is the marginal tax rate. In order to 
incorporate income uncertainty, the simulation is repeated 50 times and averages of MTRs 
are calculated for every year and for every firm as long as sufficient past information exists
to make an earnings forecast. Marginal tax rates are calculated for different levels of interest
expense (0%-800%). Following Graham (2000), I assume that the interest coverage ratio, 
beyond year t, is constant at year t value in profitable states, but I maintain year t interest in 
unprofitable states.
I refine MTRs at three levels: MTRnone is calculated before aggregate financing (debt or 
pension), MTRint is calculated after debt financing and MTRall is calculated after aggregate 
financing.  The above simulation procedure differs from Graham’s in two respects. First, the 
taxable income is adjusted for tax treatment of pensions. Second, the pension contribution is 
added to the regular interest expense to form a consolidated interest expense.
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Appendix II:
AMR Corporation: Extract from 10-k filling, 2002
Note 12: Retirement benefits
All regular employees of the Company are eligible to participate in pension plans. The 
defined benefit plans provide benefits for participating employees based on years of service 
and average compensation for a specified period of time before retirement. 
The following table provides a reconciliation of the changes in the plans' benefit 
obligations and fair value of assets for the years ended December 31, 2002 and 2001, and a 
statement of funded status as of December 31, 2002 and 2001 (in millions): 
Pension Benefits
2002 2001 
Reconciliation of benefit obligation
Obligation at January 1 $ 7422 $ 6434 
Service cost 352 260 
Interest cost 569 515 
Actuarial loss 820 416 
Plan amendments 65 168 
Acquisition of TWA — —
Benefit payments (394) (371)
Settlements (77) —
Obligation at December 31 $ 8757 $ 7422 
Reconciliation of fair value of plan assets
Fair value of plan assets at January 1 $ 5482 $ 5731 
Actual return on plan assets (16) 1 
Employer contributions 328 121 
Benefit payments (394) (371)
Settlements (77) —
Fair value of plan assets at December 31 $ 5323 $ 5482 
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Funded status
Accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) $ 7344 $ 6041 
Projected benefit obligation (PBO) 8757 7422 
Accumulated postretirement benefit 
obligation (APBO)
— —
Fair value of assets 5323 5482 
Funded status at December 31 (3434) (1940)
Unrecognized loss (gain) 2709 1454 
Unrecognized prior service cost 330 286 
Unrecognized transition asset (4) (5)
Net amount recognized $ (399) $ (205)
As of December 31, 2002, the accumulated benefit obligation and the fair value of plan 
assets for pension plans with accumulated benefit obligations in excess of plan assets were 
approximately $7.3 billion and $5.3 billion, respectively. As of December 31, 2001, the 
accumulated benefit obligation and the fair value of plan assets for pension plans with 
accumulated benefit obligations in excess of plan assets were approximately $4.2 billion and 
$3.6 billion, respectively. 
At December 31, 2002 and 2001, other benefits plan assets of approximately $98 million 
and $93 million, respectively, were invested in shares of mutual funds managed by a 
subsidiary of AMR. 
The following tables provide the components of net periodic benefit cost for the years 
ended December 31, 2002, 2001 and 2000 (in millions): 
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Pension Benefits
2002 2001 2000
Components of net periodic benefit cost
Defined benefit plans:
Service cost $ 352 $ 260 $ 213 
Interest cost 569 515 467 
Expected return on assets (501) (539) (490)
Amortization of:
Transition asset (1) (1) (1)
Prior service cost 21 11 10 
Unrecognized net loss 49 22 17 
Settlement loss 33 — —
Net periodic benefit cost for defined 
benefit plans
522 268 216 
The following table provides the amounts recognized in the consolidated balance sheets as 
of December 31, 2002 and 2001 (in millions): 
Pension benefits
2002 2001 
Prepaid benefit cost $ 54 $ 123 
Accrued benefit liability (453) (328)
Additional minimum liability (1623) (335)
Intangible asset 330 163 
Accumulated other comprehensive loss 1293 172 
Net amount recognized $ (399) $ (205)
Note: Compustat discloses the net amount recognized (data290) as prepaid/ accrued 
pension benefit and pension cost (data295), but not the employer contribution. Also note that 
the accounts related to the AML adjustment cancel out in the calculation of the recognized 
amount).
Pension contribution=Data295+Data290 (i.e. $ 328 = $522+ (-399-(-205)).
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Figure 1
The aggregate level of pension funding
This figure shows the aggregate level of pension funding as the difference between aggregate pension assets and 
liabilities. The pension liability as measured by the projected benefit obligation (data286+data294) and the fair value 
of assets (data287+data296) are in the footnotes of the financial statements.  Until 1998, sponsoring companies were 
required to disclose separately information for underfunded and overfunded plans. The amounts recognized on the 
balance sheet are calculated as the aggregate net amount of the accrued pension liability, prepaid pension liability, 
intangible asset and additional minimum liability (data290+data300-data298). 
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Figure 2
Differences between reported and consolidated leverage
The figure shows the difference between leverage calculated based on balance sheet items and leverage calculated 
on consolidated accounts. Reported book leverage is calculated based as the ratio between long term debt 
(data9+data44) and the value of assets (data6). Reported market leverage is calculated as the ratio between long term 
debt and the market value of the firm (data6-data216+data25*data199). Consolidated leverage is calculated by 
redefining assets as operating assets plus pension assets minus already recognized pension items. Similarly, long 
term debt is increased by the present value of the pension liabilities. Total liabilities are also adjusted for any 
deferred taxes resulting from the additional minimum liability adjustment.
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Figure 3
Effect of pension contributions on marginal tax rates
for Pepsi Bottling Group ( 2002)
Gross tax benefit  curves for Pepsi Bottling Group,  2002
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Notes: 
Notation Definition
MTRnone Marginal tax rate before all financing (the simulated tax rate is based on earnings before taxes, before 
interest expense and pension contribution). 
MTRint Marginal tax rates after the interest expense is deducted. 
MTRall Marginal tax rates after interest expense and pension contribution.
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Figure 4
Aggregate effect of pension plan contributions on marginal tax rates
This figure shows the incremental effect of pension contributions on marginal tax rates, from 1991 to 2003. The 
number of the sponsoring companies in the sample changes during this period from 1,318 to 1,216, whereas the 
number of non-sponsoring companies changes from 3,551 to 3,652. Mean levels of the marginal tax rates are 
calculated for each percentage of interest deductions used in the simulation analysis.
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Figure 5
Tax benefits of debt
This figure shows the value of the gross tax benefits of debt, for both sponsoring and non-sponsoring companies. 
Gross tax benefits are calculated as the area under the benefit function (up to the point of the actual interest 
expense). The line marked with squares shows the total gross tax benefits from both reported debt and pension debt, 
whereas the line marked with diamonds shows only the tax benefits associated with interest deductions on debt. 
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Table 1
Balance sheet pension plan exposure
The sample includes all Compustat firms reporting pension assets and liabilities, from 1991 to 2003, and for which 
sufficient information exists to calculate book and market leverage ratios. Plan assets are measured by their fair 
value (data287+data296) whereas pension liabilities are measured by the disclosed projected benefit obligation 
(data286+data294). Contributions are estimated by comparing the pension plan recognized balance sheet items with 
the disclosed pension cost (data295+data290). Funding level is defined as pension assets minus pension liabilities. 
Long term debt is calculated as the amount of debt obligations due more than one year (data9) plus the current 
portion of the long term debt (data44).  Total debt is calculated as assets (data6) minus book equity (data216). 
Adjusted operating income (EBIT) is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (data13) plus pension cost 
(data295).
Panel A : Firms reporting pension assets and liabilities
Interest
(millions)
Contributions
(millions)
Reported 
pension 
cost
(millions)
Year Nr.  of firms
Ratio of 
plan 
assets to 
firm 
assets
Ratio of  
pension liability 
to total book 
debt
Contribution 
to EBIT 
(adjusted for 
pensions)
Interest to 
EBIT (adjusted 
for pensions)
1991 1272 0.165 0.316 0.034 0.321 96.54 12.91 11.972
1992 1307 0.167 0.318 0.061 0.258 86.889 17.01 12.495
1993 1352 0.17 0.319 0.03 0.171 76.764 15.013 14.269
1994 1386 0.152 0.28 0.051 0.169 76.767 32.457 18.95
1995 1411 0.208 0.317 0.034 0.159 80.661 27.184 15.334
1996 1430 0.215 0.314 0.04 0.275 81.972 30.939 14.398
1997 1421 0.175 0.299 0.038 0.106 84.181 22.304 12.916
1998 1385 0.177 0.301 0.029 0.113 91.816 40.317 14.691
1999 1306 0.189 0.288 0.024 0.254 110.126 33.18 8.008
2000 1271 0.173 0.268 0.039 0.027 130.699 45.061 1.675
2001 1269 0.154 0.287 -0.01 -0.698 145.426 35.299 14.018
2002 1274 0.139 0.296 0.054 0.128 138.653 63.319 23.468
2003 1107 0.177 0.375 0.091 0.205 139.641 89.516 40.631
Firm 
year 
obs
17191 0.175 0.305 0.039 0.118 101.728 34.909 15.316
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Panel B: Firms reporting long term debt and pension liabilities
Year Number of  firms 
with LT debt
Ratio Contribution to 
Interest 
Ratio PBO to 
LT debt
Ratio funding to 
LT debt
1991 1232 0.495 3.075 0.058
1992 1256 0.680 3.623 0.127
1993 1300 0.684 7.581 0.452
1994 1330 0.921 2.916 -0.246
1995 1360 0.665 3.952 -0.438
1996 1373 1.124 4.392 0.113
1997 1364 0.803 3.318 0.092
1998 1331 0.874 2.718 0.070
1999 1251 0.590 2.569 0.247
2000 1218 0.729 2.772 0.108
2001 1218 0.596 3.939 -0.501
2002 1219 1.043 3.696 -0.982
2003 1058 1.431 7.553 -0.675
Total 16510 0.8141 3.965 -0.110
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Panel C: Balance sheet exposure for GM, at the end of fiscal year 2001
This table compares reported assets and liabilities with the true assets and liabilities after all the off balance sheet 
assets and liabilities have been consolidated on the balance sheet. There are several pension items that are 
recognized on balance sheet. The prepaid pension cost represents the cumulative employer contributions in excess 
over accrued net pension cost. The accrued pension cost represents cumulative pension cost in excess of employer’s 
contributions.  If the company sponsors only one pension plan, one of the two items appears on balance sheet.  For 
severely underfunded plans, where ABO exceeds the fair value of assets, FASB mandated a minimum balance sheet 
liability (AML) equal to their difference. The increased liability is directly reflected in the accrued pension cost and 
it is offset by an increased in intangible assets.  However, if the unrecognized prior service cost is below the AML, 
the difference is directly charged to equity (as part of the comprehensive income).  The amounts shown in the 
pension footnote are pretax. The actual charge to shareholder’s equity is taken on an after tax basis with the 
difference charged to deferred taxes.  Book (market) leverage is calculated as long term debt over book (market) 
value of assets. In order to calculate the actual leverage ratios, long term debt is adjusted for the pension liability.
Reported on Balance Sheet Pension related adjustments
($billions) ($billions) 
Reported assets (in $ billions) $324.00 
Less Prepaid Cost ($7.50)
Less intangible asset ($6.20)
Plus pension plan asset $73.70 
        Adjusted assets $384.00 
Reported Liabilities (in $billions) $303.50 
Less Accrued benefits ($10.80)
Plus AML tax deferment adjustment $5.80 
Plus pension liability $86.30 
        Adjusted liabilities $384.80 
Net worth $20.50 ($1.00)
LT Debt $126.70 $213.00 
Book leverage 0.39 0.53
Market leverage 0.38 0.52
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Table 2
Reported and consolidated leverage ratios
DBP = 1 if the firm is sponsoring a pension plan, DBP = 0 otherwise. The reported balance sheet leverage ratios are 
calculated as follows: Market leverage is the ratio of long term debt (data9+data44) to the market value of the 
company. Book leverage is the ratio between long term debt and book value of assets (data6). Market value is 
defined as book value of assets, minus book equity (data216) plus the market value of equity (data25 x data199). For 
the consolidated balance sheet, the book debt and book asset values are adjusted for pensions. All recognized 
pension items are removed from the balance sheet and the true pension assets and liabilities are being incorporated.  
Consolidated leverage is calculated by redefining assets as operating assets plus pension assets minus already 
recognized pension items (data6+ data287+data296-data290-data300). Similarly, long term debt is increased by the 
present value of the pension liabilities (data9+data44+data287+data296). When calculating the consolidated value of 
the firm, total liabilities are also adjusted for any deferred taxes resulting from the additional minimum liability 
adjustment (data298).
Firm - year 
observations
Mean
leverage
Mean leverage     
(after consolidation)
Difference   
   (Wilcoxon statistic)
Debt/Assets ratio(MV)
   DBP=1 17,191 0.20 0.27 0.07*
0.16 0.17
   DBP=0 60,127 0.14 0.14
0.27 0.27
Total sample 77,318 0.21 0.23
Debt/Assets ratio (BV)
   DBP=1 21231 0.26 0.35 0.09*
0.21 0.19
   DBP=0 60127 0.20 0.20
0.18 0.18
Total sample 77318 0.15 0.18
* Significant at 0.01 level
Notes: Standard deviations in italics
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Table 3
Sample characteristics of pension sponsors/non-sponsors 
relative to debt issuers/ non-issuers
This table partitions the data into debt issuers/ non-issuers and pension sponsors/non-sponsors. Book leverage is
calculated as the ratio of long term debt to book value of assets. Market leverage is calculated as the ratio of long 
term debt to the market value of the company. The company market value is defined as book value of assets, minus 
book equity plus market value of equity. Zscore is a modified version of Altman’s  (1968) Z-score. OENEG is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the book value of the common equity is negative. Collateral is equal to net property, 
plant and equipment normalized by book assets. The kink represents the level of deductions (normalized by actual 
deductions) required to make marginal tax rates decline.
Panel A: Sample means of variables based on the adoption of a pension plan
Variable 
No Pension
 (Firm-year obs:  
43,204)
Pension 
(Firm-year obs: 
15,644)
Book leverage 0.202 0.256
Market leverage 0.155 0.202
Size (log of assets) 4.325 6.603
Market to book 2.047 1.572
Zscore 0.486 1.728
Collateral 0.427 0.513
Research and development 0.090 0.018
Return on assets 0.037 0.127
OENEG 0.046 0.045
Before financing marginal tax rate (MTRnone) 0.259 0.324
After interest only marginal tax rate (MTRint) 0.227 0.297
After interest and pension marginal tax rate (MTRall) 0.227 0.293
Kink without pension 1.061 2.032
Kink with pension 1.061 1.722
Panel B: Sample means of variables based on the usage of debt
Variable
No debt    
(Firm-year obs:=8059)
With Debt (Firm-
year obs:=50789)
Book leverage 0.000 0.250
Market leverage 0.000 0.194
Size (log of assets) 3.715 5.123
Market to book 2.629 1.808
Zscore 0.257 0.905
Collateral 0.301 0.474
Research and development 0.158 0.057
Return on assets -0.006 0.072
OENEG 0.035 0.048
Before financing marginal tax rate (MTRnone) 0.242 0.282
After interest only marginal tax rate (MTRint) 0.229 0.249
After interest and pension marginal tax rate (MTRall) 0.229 0.247
Kink without pension 1.475 1.295
Kink with pension 1.450 1.234
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Table 4
Distribution of marginal tax rates per year and type of firm
DBP = 1 if the firm is sponsoring a pension plan, DBP = 0 otherwise.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Average 
MTR
DBP = 0
N 3,551 3,732 4,749 4,903 5,403 5,408 5,395 5,223 5,104 5,110 4,795 4,499 3,652
MTRall 0.206 0.214 0.235 0.243 0.245 0.247 0.23 0.223 0.22 0.209 0.201 0.205 0.2 0.223
MTRint 0.206 0.214 0.235 0.243 0.245 0.247 0.23 0.224 0.22 0.209 0.201 0.205 0.201 0.223
MTRnone 0.248 0.253 0.274 0.278 0.281 0.277 0.262 0.256 0.256 0.245 0.235 0.238 0.232 0.258
DBP = 1
N 1,318 1,339 1,491 1,530 1,519 1,587 1,548 1,448 1,406 1,384 1,396 1,376 1,216
MTRall 0.277 0.274 0.287 0.299 0.304 0.302 0.299 0.294 0.291 0.292 0.286 0.288 0.276 0.288
MTRint 0.28 0.278 0.291 0.304 0.308 0.306 0.305 0.3 0.296 0.298 0.289 0.293 0.286 0.296
MTRnone 0.313 0.315 0.324 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.329 0.325 0.325 0.328 0.32 0.324 0.317 0.325
All firms
N 4,869 5,071 6,240 6,433 6,922 6,995 6,943 6,671 6,510 6,494 6,191 5,875 4,868
MTRall 0.225 0.23 0.248 0.256 0.258 0.26 0.245 0.239 0.235 0.226 0.22 0.224 0.219 0.238
MTRint 0.225 0.231 0.249 0.257 0.259 0.261 0.246 0.24 0.236 0.228 0.221 0.226 0.222 0.240
MTRnone 0.265 0.269 0.286 0.291 0.292 0.29 0.277 0.271 0.271 0.262 0.254 0.258 0.253 0.273
Notes: 
Notation Definition
MTRnone Marginal tax rate before all financing (the simulated tax rate is based on earnings before taxes, before 
interest expense and pension contribution). 
MTRint Marginal tax rates after the interest expense is deducted. 
MTRall Marginal tax rates after interest expense and pension contribution.
63
Table 5
Tax benefits of debt
The total tax benefits (TB) from aggregate debt (including pensions) is equal to the area under each firm’s gross tax benefit function, up to the actual 
aggregate interest expense. The aggregate (consolidated) interest expense is calculated as the sum of the regular interest expense and the pension 
contribution. TB from debt (excluding pensions) is calculated ignoring the tax deductibility of the pension contribution. The present value of tax benefits 
(PV of TB) from current and future deductions is calculated under the assumption that tax shields are perpetual, while using Moody’s average bond yield as 
a discount rate. MV represents the market value of the firm and TA represents its book value of assets. The kink is the amount of interest where the marginal 
tax benefit function becomes downward sloping, expressed as a percentage of actual aggregate interest deductions.
Year Nr. of firms Consolidated interest /Interest expense
TB with pensions/TB 
without pensions
PV of TB without 
pensions/MV 
PV of TB with 
pensions /MV
PV of TB without 
pensions/TA 
PV of TB with 
pensions/TA
Change in kink 
due to pensions
1991 1,101 1.353 1.228 0.080 0.095 0.109 0.131 0.187
1992 1,127 1.55 1.421 0.082 0.097 0.115 0.139 0.228
1993 1,278 1.48 1.279 0.076 0.092 0.114 0.140 0.239
1994 1,302 1.609 1.522 0.071 0.089 0.102 0.130 0.279
1995 1,329 1.49 1.815 0.076 0.094 0.111 0.140 0.282
1996 1,352 1.705 1.542 0.078 0.099 0.116 0.153 0.326
1997 1,342 1.591 1.389 0.072 0.090 0.115 0.147 0.326
1998 1,272 1.61 1.414 0.089 0.113 0.131 0.170 0.323
1999 1,225 1.514 1.317 0.082 0.100 0.115 0.145 0.308
2000 1,208 1.4 1.335 0.085 0.102 0.117 0.143 0.316
2001 1,204 1.502 1.46 0.079 0.096 0.112 0.140 0.319
2002 1,184 1.817 1.818 0.079 0.104 0.109 0.150 0.389
2003 1,014 2.111 1.652 0.063 0.106 0.121 0.162 0.582
Total 15,938 1.591 1.477 0.078 0.098 0.114 0.145 0.313
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Table 6
Relationship between reported and pension debt
This table reports the estimation results of the effect of the pension plan on the amount of debt firms carry on 
their balance sheets. The capital structure choice of the firm is modeled as a system of three decisions: (1) 
sponsoring a defined benefit plan (selectivity decision); (2) choosing the size of the pension liability (off 
balance sheet leverage decision); (3) choosing the size of the book debt (balance sheet leverage decision). The 
estimation is divided into two separate systems: panel A includes the results of a selectivity model that predicts 
the pension liability whereas panel B includes the results of a treatment effects model. 
Panel A: Results of the selectivity model 
Pension liability is calculated as the projected benefit obligation (PBO) and it is normalized by consolidated 
assets. DBP is set to 1 if the firm is sponsoring a defined benefit plan and 0 otherwise. The degree of 
unionization per industry is reported in the Current Population Survey for the year available at the Department 
of Labor. The number of employees is obtained from Compustat (data29). The age of the plan is number of 
years the firm has reported information on pensions on Compustat. The year of adoption refers to the year of the 
first disclosure of pension assets and liabilities on Compustat. Profitability is measured by ROA (data13) and its 
volatility is calculated on the last 10 years of available information. Market to Book is the market value of the 
firm (market equity plus book debt) divided by book assets.
Selection equation:               itttit XaZaaDBP +++= 12110*
1=itDBP  if 0* >itDBP and 0=itDBP  if 0* itDBP
Pension benefits size:           ittitit XccPENSIONDBP ++=> 221* *:0
Pension Choice Pension Liability
1st stage 2nd stage
Coef z Coef z
Unionization 0.034 * 34.02
No. of employees 0.004 * 17.53 0.000 *** 1.59
Market to Book -0.208 * -32.48 0.014 * 7.35
Profitability (ROA) 2.133 * 38.44 -0.355 * -15.65
ROA volatility 0.000 ** 21.71 -0.001 * -4.05
Age of the plan 0.004 * 5.69
Year of adoption -0.001 -2.47
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes
N 53,518 14,041
Rho -0.695
sigma 0.127
lambda -0.084
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Panel B: Results of a treatment effects model of capital structure decisions for firms with/ without pension plans
DBP is set to 1 if the firm is sponsoring a defined benefit plan and 0 otherwise. Fitted values of pension 
benefits, 
^
PENSION (normalized by consolidated assets), are derived from the selection-bias corrected pension 
benefit equation. itLEV is long term balance sheet debt (normalized by consolidated assets). Pension benefits are 
equal to zero for non sponsoring companies. MTRnone is the simulated marginal tax rate before any interest or 
pension contributions are deducted. ZSCORE is a modified version of Altman’s (1968) Z-score. OENEG is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the book value of the common equity is negative. COLLATERAL is equal to net 
property, plant and equipment normalized by book assets. Dummy (Foreign Income) is 1 if the reported sales on 
non domestic sales as disclosed by the geographical segment data is at least 10% of domestic sales.
Selection equation:        itttit XaZaaDBP +++= 12110*
1=itDBP  if 0* >itDBP and 0=itDBP  if 0* itDBP
Leverage equation:        ittititit XbPENSIONDBPbDBPbbLEV ++++= 33
^
321 *** (1)
(and alternatively)           
ittitititit XbomeForeignIncDummyPENSIONDBPPENSIONDBPbDBPbbLEV ++++= 33
^^
321 )(***** (2)
Treatment regression Simple OLS 
(endogeneity and selectivity corrected) (no correction)
(1) (2) (3)
Coef z Coef z Coef z
Dummy (Foreign Income) -0.045 * -21.68
DBP   -0.039 -0.54 -0.017 *** -1.64 0.025 * 10.44
DBP * Predicted Pension Liab -0.360 * -5.62 -0.412 * -10.28 -0.440 * -34.82
DBP * Predicted Pension Liab *                         
Dummy (Foreign Income) 0.137 * -21.68 *
MTRnone 0.079 * 4.30 0.094 * 9.53 0.067 * 0.07
Log Assets (Consolidated) 0.022 ** 3.13 0.025 ** 48.24 0.019 * 45.23
Market to Book ratio -0.020 * -15.13 -0.021 * -37.51 -0.020 * -42.64
ZSCORE -0.007 * -12.50 -0.008 * -26.69 -0.007 * -27.40
OENEG 0.224 * 20.46 0.236 * 61.28 0.242 * 66.36
Operating profit volatility -0.001 * -13.70 0.000 * -13.4 0.000 * -18.58
COLLATERAL 0.219 * 21.32 0.210 * 55.99 0.212 * 60.66
Year and industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
N 53004 53004 53004
R-squared 0.252
Hazard lambda 0.015 0.021
Rho 0.087 0.119
Sigma 0.174 0.173
* Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, ** statistically significant at the 10% level.
